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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of climate-related risk on firms’ cost of capital and access
to finance. Building on recent findings that climate vulnerability significantly increases
sovereign cost of debt, we posit a ‘pass-through effect’ whereby higher sovereign cost of
debt affects firms’ cost of capital in two ways: it raises the costs of corporate debt; and it
induces financial exclusion as credit-constrained firms are priced out of the market due to
credit rationing. We invoke panel data regressions and structural equation models, using
firm-level data from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database matched with ORBIS/Bureau
van Dijk data on financial firms. We also use a novel measure, the distance to the steady-
state, to estimate firms’ production functions, their steady-state and the shadow price of
access to finance (or financial inclusion). Our empirical findings confirm the posited ef-
fects of the climate vulnerability risk premium on sovereign debt on both corporate cost
of capital and on firms’ financial inclusion. Our analysis of 63,102 firms in 80 countries
over the period 1993-2017 shows that on average the cost of debt in high-risk countries is
0.83 percentage points higher than in low-risk countries because of climate vulnerability.
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1. Introduction
Climate risk is real. Indeed, the frequency of natural disasters such as droughts, ex-
treme temperatures, floods, landslides and storms, is on the rise (ECIU, 2017). This dra-
matic increase in weather-related catastrophes translates into enormous economic costs.
The direct link between catastrophic natural disasters and economic growth is empirically
established (Cavallo et al., 2013). Moreover, both climate change and natural disasters are
associated with significant negative effects on economic growth, as shown, for instance,
by Mei et al. (2015); Mendelsohn et al. (2015); Felbermayr and Groschl (2014); Alano
and Lee (2016); and Ferreira and Karali (2015), among others.
One interesting dimension of these economic costs relates to the recent empirical evi-
dence by Kling et al. (2018) that climate risk increases the cost of sovereign borrowing. It
is found that that climate risk, as measured by the Notre-Dame Global Adaptation Initia-
tive (ND-GAIN) sub-indices for climate sensitivity and capacity, has increased sovereign
debt costs by 1.17 percentage points on average for climate vulnerable developing coun-
tries over the last decade. This fiscal impact of climate risk is important because climate
vulnerable countries can only access debt at a higher risk premium that is triggered by cli-
mate risk. The cost at which governments can access finance affects the public budget and
the government’s ability to invest in climate mitigation and adaptation; it also constrains
possible investments in areas such as infrastructure, education and public health.
An equally interesting question is how the increased cost of sovereign debt affects the
performance of firms in climate vulnerable countries, i.e., what are the ramifications of
climate vulnerability for investments undertaken by the private sector? In a recent attempt
to address this question, Huang et al. (2018) investigate the effect of climate-related risk on
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financing choices by publicly listed firms across the world. It is found that firms located in
climate vulnerable countries anticipate the likelihood of loss from major storms, flooding,
heat waves, and other adverse weather conditions by holding more cash, less short-term
debt but more long-term debt, and are less likely to distribute cash dividends. It is also
found that firms in certain industries are less vulnerable to extreme weather and so face
less climate-related risk. However, the more directly relevant question is the ‘pass through
effect’ from the increase in sovereign cost of debt to an increase in firms’ cost of debt
capital, associated with climate risk. To the best of our knowledge, this question has not
been addressed in the existing literature.
In this paper, we address the above question by examining the implications of the cli-
mate vulnerability risk premium on sovereign debt for the private corporate sector. Higher
sovereign cost of debt can be expected to affect firms’ cost of capital in two ways: first,
it raises the costs of corporate debt, and second, it causes financial exclusion as firms are
being priced out of the market due to credit rationing. These effects reduce firm value
(e.g., market to book value) as discounted cash flows have lower value and lead to less
investment. Lower investment, in turn, limits firms’ competitiveness and growth. We first
discuss these relationships theoretically. Subsequently, we investigate this nexus empiri-
cally.
In summary, our paper combines the effect of climate vulnerability on the cost of cor-
porate debt as well as financial exclusion of firms. Our empirical findings confirm the pre-
dicted effects of the climate vulnerability risk premium on sovereign debt on the financing
conditions of the private corporate sector. We find effects both on the cost of capital and
on financial exclusion. Both effects limit growth, which in turn reduces productivity from
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economies of scale and investment into better production technologies. We therefore con-
clude that climate vulnerability is holding back the competitiveness and the development
prospects of the corporate sector in climate vulnerable developing economies.
The analysis sheds light on a hitherto under-appreciated cost of climate change for
climate vulnerable developing economies: higher corporate financing cost and financial
exclusion hold back economic development and by restraining fiscal revenue limit the
scope of governments to invest in public (climate resilient) infrastructure and climate adap-
tation, which in turn curb growth prospects and put firms in climate vulnerable develop-
ing economies at a disadvantage when competing in both domestic and export markets.
In other words, the climate vulnerability risk premium causes a vicious circle, where a
higher cost of capital reduces both sovereign and private sector investment, suppresses
firm growth and tax revenue and limits the scope for public adaptation finance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section
3 then discusses theoretically the effect of climate vulnerability on the cost of corporate
debt as well as financial exclusion of firms. Section 4 provides an overview of the data
and variables that we use for our empirical analysis, followed by a review of descriptive
findings in Section 5. Section 6 presents and discusses the results of our multivariate
analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2. Prior research
The economic impact of climate risk on both countries and corporations is complex and
sometimes ambivalent. Several studies have investigated the relationship between global
climate change and economic performance at the country-level (Dell et al., 2014; Nord-
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haus, 2006). A number of studies have also examined the influence of climate change
on firm-level performance. Climate change may impact businesses from any industry
and size. Firms may face several climate risk related issues such as emission-reduction
regulation and negative reactions from environmentally concerned investors/lenders. For
instance, Beatty and Shimshack (2010) explore the relationship between greenhouse gas
emissions and stock market returns. They find that some investors tend to react adversely
to new information about greenhouse gas emissions, leading to a substantial decrease in
stock market valuation between 0.6 and 1.6 percent. Another study by Konar and Co-
hen (2001) reports that bad environmental performance is negatively associated with the
intangible asset value of firms.
Even if government regulations intended to curtail greenhouse gas emissions are not
currently introduced in every country, it may be a significant indicator for environmentally
sensitive investors and lenders which increasingly demand more disclosure from firms.
Matsumura et al. (2013) collected carbon emissions data from S&P 500 firms over the
period 2006-2008 and find a negative relationship between carbon emissions and firm
value. Their results suggest that firm value might fall by $212,000 for every additional
thousand metric tons of carbon emissions.
Investors are increasingly considering environmental, social and governance (ESG)
performance of businesses before they take investment decisions. Chava (2014) identifies
the effect of firms’ environmental profile on their cost of equity and debt capital. Ac-
cording to this research, investors require higher expected returns from companies that are
less concerned about climate change. Furthermore, Chava (2014) also finds that lenders
charge a significantly lower interest rate on bank loans to environmentally responsible
5
firms. More recently, Huang et al. (2018) analyze a dataset comprising 353,906 obser-
vations from 55 countries and find that climate risk at country level might be negatively
related to firm earnings and positively related to earnings volatility.
Previous research has also indicated that various environmental indicators have a pos-
itive impact on firms’ cost of capital. Sharfman and Fernando (2008) examine data from
267 U.S. firms and assert that there is a negative relationship between environmental risk
management and cost of capital, suggesting that better environmental risk management
contributes to reducing firms’ cost of equity.
El Ghoul et al. (2011) analyze data from 12,915 firms between 1992 and 2007 and find
that corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices have an influence on equity financing.
In particular, dealing with employee relations and environmental issues decreases firms’
cost of equity. Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find a negative association between vol-
untary disclosure of CSR activities and firms’ cost of equity capital. Therefore, this may
draw more attention of institutional investors and analyst coverage.
Climate risk is increasingly recognized as a serious and worldwide concern for both
governments and businesses. However, much uncertainty still exists about the relation
between climate risk and cost of capital. Although some research has been carried out
on the effect of global climate risk on firm performance using cross-country data (Huang
et al., 2018), there is very little scientific understanding of the impact of climate risk as a
determinant of firms’ cost of capital. This study aims to address this research gap.
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3. Theoretical considerations
A firm’s cost of capital refers to its weighted average cost of capital (WACC), denoted
rWACC, which depends on the proportion of debt finance (D) to debt and equity (D+E), the
cost of debt (rD), the cost of equity (rE) and the marginal tax rate (τ). The latter matters
as interest expenses are tax deductible, reducing the after-tax cost of capital. Denoting the
proportion of debt finance L = DD+E , i.e. financial leverage, (1) states the WACC:
rWACC = L · rD · (1 − τ) + (1 − L) · rE (1)
Due to differences in payout profiles, equity holders bear more risk than debt holders,
requiring higher expected returns. This implies rE > rD. It is obvious from (1) that climate
vulnerability (CV) can increase the WACC rWACC in three ways: (1) ∂L∂CV < 0 (shift to
equity: it is more difficult to secure debt finance, e.g. due to volatile cash flows); (2)
∂rD
∂CV > 0 (increased cost of debt); and (3)
∂rE
∂CV > 0 (increased cost of equity).
Considering the cost of debt, we can state the following components, where r f refers to
the risk-free rate, d is a default component (credit spread), and l is a liquidity component.
The spread s contains the default and liquidity component:
rD = r f + ∆INF + ∆EX + d + l =
K∑
k=1
ckDk + r f + s (2)
The risk-free rate usually refers to the yield of ten-year US government bonds. If debt
is taken outside the US, country risk needs to be added (using country dummies Dk with
k = 1, 2, . . . ,K), and the expected difference in inflation should be considered ∆INF.
If debt is denominated in a foreign currency, differences in expected inflation should be
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reflected in exchange rates (purchasing power parity). Thus, an exchange rate effect can
be added to (2).
The problem is that, empirically, most of these components cannot be determined due
to lack of data. First, credit default swaps (CDS) are not available for most companies;
hence, we cannot decompose the spread into a default and liquidity component. This is
not a major limitation as working with annual data should suggest a low average liquidity
component. Furthermore, the impact of climate vulnerability on default risk is more plau-
sible. Second, financial data does not provide details on USD denominated debt and debt
in other currencies. Hence, using country dummies we proxy country risk and other fac-
tors such as inflation differentials and exchange rate changes. Alternatively, both factors
could be included in an empirical specification.
From (2), climate vulnerability can affect cost of debt in three ways: (1) changing
country risk; (2) influencing the risk-free rate, which seems to be less likely; (3) increasing
the spread mainly due to higher default risk.
Finally, cost of equity is explained using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM),
which links firms’ cost of equity to the risk-free rate, the expected market risk premium
and systematic risk through the beta coefficient. Note that rm refers to the market return,
and E is the expectations operator:
rE = r f + β
(
Erm − r f
)
(3)
Climate vulnerability can increase cost of equity by (1) shifting the risk-free rate as in
the case of cost of debt, (2) changing the market risk premium, and (3) increasing a firm’s
beta coefficient. The latter point seems to be plausible at first; however, one needs to note
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that
∑N
i=1 βi = 1, where i = 1, 2, . . . ,N refers to firms. This is true as the market return is
the sample average return. Thus, the average beta cannot increase due to climate change.
Furthermore, there are empirical limitations. First, beta coefficients trend to vary over
time. Second, the CAPM has low predictive power in less developed markets. Hence, it
might be better to estimate country-level betas using countries’ leading stock market index
compared to the MSCI world market index.
The arguments thus far implicitly assume that firms have access to finance, i.e. firms
make a choice between debt and equity finance reaching their desired leverage L and rais-
ing their desired level of capital to invest and grow the firm. However, financial inclusion
is not guaranteed and potentially itself a function of climate vulnerability. Hence, climate
vulnerability might increase cost of debt under the condition that firms have access to fi-
nance, and climate vulnerability might contribute to a higher probability to be financially
excluded. The latter also causes costs due to delayed investment. This can be quantified by
deriving the shadow price of external finance. In a theoretical model developed by Kling
(2018), firms with access to a given production technology face financial constraints which
reduce these firms’ ability to invest. In particular, firms cannot raise enough capital exter-
nally to invest in their capital stock and hence must rely on internal finance (cash flows).
The exclusion from external finance reduces their ability to grow their capital stock. Con-
sequently, firms that are excluded from capital markets cannot reach their full potential
determined by their production technology, i.e., they grow more slowly. This slow growth
results in a quantifiable cost, the shadow price of access to finance.
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4. Data and variables
For our econometric analysis we use firm-level data from the Thomson Reuters Eikon
database and match these with ORBIS/Bureau van Dijk data on financial firms. We derive
firms’ cost of debt and their financial health including financial leverage, net operating
working capital and interest coverage. Based on these firm-level indicators, we derive
the impact on climate vulnerability on cost of debt using panel data regressions. Apart
from the direct effect of climate vulnerability on the cost of debt, we consider financial
exclusion using a novel measure, the distance to steady-state developed by Kling (2018).
Using standard methods, we estimate firms’ production functions, their steady-state and
the shadow price of access to finance. The latter serves as a measure of financial exclusion.
In this research, we investigate the role of climate vulnerability (VUL) in affecting a
firm’s cost of debt. Climate vulnerability data are obtained from the Notre Dame Global
Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN). This Index brings together 74 variables to form 45 core
indicators for 181 countries to measure environmental vulnerability and readiness which
means how ready they are to adapt. It also offers various information to us about which
countries are best prepared to handle global changes and climate risk.
We also use firms’ financial data on balance sheets, income statements, and cash flow
statements from Thomson Reuters Eikon Database. Our dependent variables include mea-
sures of cost of debt (COD) and its components as outlined in Section 5.2. We estimate a
firm’s cost of debt using interest expense in year t divided by total debt reported in period
t. To obtain firm-level proxies for cost of equity (COED), we rely on dividend payments
relative to the value of equity. In addition, we derive country-level measures of cost of eq-
uity (COE) by estimating country betas (BETA) and market risk premiums (MRP). Data is
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obtained from Damodaran et al. (2013), which also includes data on credit risk measured
by yield spreads (SPREAD).
Financial leverage is another significant indicator of the degree to which a firm deals
with its debt and preferred equity. It is calculated as the ratio of a firm’s total debt to
the total debt and the book value of equity (LEV). Net operating working capital also
provides us with some insights about financial health. We measure working capital (WC)
as the excess of operating current assets over operating current liabilities. Interest coverage
shows us exactly to what extent a firm could pay its interest expenses on its debt. It is
measured by dividing earnings before interest and taxes by the interest expenses for the
same period (COVER). Additional firm-level controls are cash holding (CASH), dividend
payments (DIV), research and development spending (RD), tangible assets (TANG) and
return on assets (ROA). All variables on the firm-level are expressed relative to total assets.
Firm size (SIZE) refers to the log of total assets.
Industry controls account for the volatility of cash flows to total assets in an industry
defined based on two-digit GICS codes. Firms operating in industries most affected by
climate risk such as oil, gas, coal, energy & agriculture are flagged with an indicator
variable labeled IND RISK.
Country controls are based on the World Development Indicators database. We con-
sider the log of GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD, annual GDP per capita growth rate
(GROWTH), and population density (POP). To account for the quality of institutions and
governance, we include the rule of law (LAW) based on the World Governance Indicators.
To mitigate the impact of outliers, we apply a winsorization to all variables at the 5 and
95-percentile.
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5. Descriptive findings
5.1. Comparison of key variables
We estimate the cost of debt using interest expenses and total debt reported in firms’
balance sheets. Countries that are in the top 25% with regard to climate vulnerability are
categorized as high-risk countries, whereas countries below that threshold are regarded
as medium or low risk countries. Based on this classification, Figure 1 plots the median
cost of debt for both groups of countries, demonstrating that climate vulnerable countries
exhibit higher cost of debt.
Table 1 reports cost of debt (COD), financial leverage (LEV), working capital rela-
tive to total assets (WC) and interest coverage (COVER) for low and high-risk countries in
terms of their climate vulnerability. In line with Figure 1, cost of debt is higher in countries
more exposed to climate risk. Companies located in these countries have higher financial
leverage and lower interest coverage. However, working capital, a measure for short-term
liquidity management, seems to be similar across these two groups of countries. Accord-
ingly, descriptive evidence suggests that companies in countries with more exposure to
climate risk exhibit higher indebtedness and higher financing costs. In addition, interest
coverage suggests that financial risk is higher, which might justify higher cost of debt.
[Insert Figure 1]
[Insert Table 1]
5.2. Decomposition of cost of debt
To identify the firm (FIRM COMP), country (COUNTRY COMP) and long-run com-
ponents of cost of debt (LONGRUN COMP), we apply the decomposition developed by
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Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). We regress the log of interest expenses, ln(INTER)it, of firm
i in year t on the log of debt ln(DEBT)it. Coefficients, α0 jt and α1 jt, vary over time and
country j.
ln(INTER)it = α0 jt + α1 jt ln(DEBT)it + it (4)
(4) constitutes a benchmarking exercise, where interest expenses are related to firms’
level of debt, country and time-specific effects. In particular, firm-specific errors refer to
the observed interest expense minus the predicted value given a firm’s level of debt, where
coefficients vary over time and across countries. Country-specific effects are equal to the
difference in predicted valuations with varying time-country coefficients and predictions
based on time averages. Hence, coefficients in (4) are averaged over time so that α¯1 j =
1
T
∑T
t=1 α1 jt. The difference between predicted interest expenses based on time averages and
actual levels of debt determines the long-run component, which reflects a firm’s long-run
cost of debt.
Table 2 reports the three components of cost of debt for low and high-risk countries in
terms of climate vulnerability. Country specific differences do matter but firm and long-
term time effects seem to be relatively more important. Most importantly, firms located in
high-risk countries have on average (and based on medians) higher cost of debt overall and
in all three components. This decomposition method does not identify underlying drivers
for the three components. For instance, climate vulnerability, macroeconomic factors and
other control variables can influence all three components. Further, multivariate analysis
is needed to disentangle these observed differences. This will be conducted in Section 6.
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[Insert Table 2]
5.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics including the number of observations (N), the
mean, median (p50), standard deviation (sd), the minimum, the maximum, the 25-
percentile and the 75-percentile for the whole sample. The dependent variables refer to
cost of debt (COD) measured based on interest expenses and short and long-term debt,
the components of cost of debt (FIRM COMP, COUNTRY COMP, LONGRUN COMP)
and cost of equity (COE). To obtain measures of cost of equity two approaches are fol-
lowed. First, dividends relative to the value of equity are used to obtain firm-level mea-
sures (COED).1 Second, country-level measures refer to the country beta (BETA), i.e. the
empirical beta coefficient of the countries’ leading stock market index in relation to the
US stock market index, and the market risk premium (MRP). The estimated default risk
(SPREAD) is based on countries’ credit ratings and differences in bond yields compared
to US government bonds.
Climate vulnerability is denoted VUL and based on the Notre-Dame Global Adaptation
Initiative. The following firm-level controls are expressed relative to total assets. They
include financial leverage (LEV), net operating working capital (WC), interest coverage
(COVER), cash holding (CASH), dividend payments (DIV), research and development
(RD), tangible assets (TANG) and return on assets (ROA). Finally, to account for firm size
we use the log of total assets (SIZE).
Country-level controls refer to the log of GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD (GDP),
1The dividend based measure is of limited use for certain industries, e.g. high-tech. Hence, the study
focuses on the second approach.
14
annual GDP per capita growth rate (GROWTH), population density (POP), and the rule of
law (LAW). Industry measures account for cash flow risk in the industry (VOL) and flag
high-risk industries (IND RISK) such as oil, gas, energy and agriculture.
[Insert Table 3]
6. Multivariate analysis
6.1. The determinants of cost of debt
Selecting cost of debt as dependent variable, five OLS regressions, which account for
year dummies, provide insights into the impact of climate vulnerability (VUL) on firms’
cost of debt. Table 4 presents five model specifications. Standard errors are based on
the Huber-White sandwich estimator and hence robust in the presence of heteroscedastic-
ity. Specification [A1] demonstrates that climate vulnerability as a single factor increases
firms’ cost of debt. Model [A2] incorporates firm controls, highlighting expected partial
impacts such as negative effects of firm size (SIZE), working capital (WC), interest cov-
erage (COVER) and tangible assets (TANG). Low financial leverage (LOW) is associated
with higher cost of debt, which seems to be counter-intuitive. However, if firms face high
cost of debt, they might be forced to look for alternative sources of finance, reducing their
financial leverage. This effect might also explain that high dividend payments (DIV) are
associated with high cost of debt, which can be used as a proxy for cost of equity. Firms
with higher profitability (ROA) seem to face higher cost of debt. In countries with expen-
sive access to debt, internal finance is the predominant source of funding, explaining the
positive association between cost of debt and ROA. These effects remain unchanged even
after using random-effects models.
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Specification [A3] adds industry measures and demonstrates that firms in industries
more exposed to climate change exhibit higher cost of debt, while other partial impacts
remain unchanged. Adding country-level controls in model [A4] changes the sign of cli-
mate vulnerability but not other partial effects. Multicollinearity between GDP per capita
and climate vulnerability (correlation coefficient −0.89) and the rule of law and climate
vulnerability (correlation coefficient −0.72) is to blame for this effect. Replacing the con-
tinuous measure of climate vulnerability (VUL) with a dummy for medium to high risk
countries (MEDIUM) in model [A5] reemphasizes that climate risk does increase of cost
debt.
[Insert Table 4]
To disentangle the effect of climate vulnerability and its alleged association with coun-
tries’ GDP per capita and the rule of law, we specify a structural equation model (SEM).
Figure 2 illustrates the simplified structure of the model, which permits that climate vulner-
ability affects cost of debt directly and indirectly through its interaction with country-level
variables. Note that CON in Figure 2 refers to other control variables. Table 5 depicts
the initial specification [S 1]. This model exhibits inadequate goodness-of-fit measures
as the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is not below 0.05 and the
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is not above 0.95 as suggested by Acock (2013). Hence, in
line with Wooldridge (2010) and So¨rbom (1989) we determine modification indices and
incorporate additional variables (one-by-one) and the covariance between error terms of
GDP per capita and the rule of law. Subsequent models such as [S 2] and finally [S 3] meet
the required criteria.
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Climate vulnerability (VUL) has a negative direct effect on cost of debt but a posi-
tive indirect effect through countries’ level of development based on log GDP per capita.
Hence, countries with higher climate risk exhibit lower log GDP per capita, resulting in
higher cost of debt. The interrelation between economic development, the rule of law and
climate risk is more complicated. After accounting for all control variables, the direct im-
pact of the rule of law on cost of debt is positive – but the coefficient is small, suggesting
low economic significance. This finding seems to be counter-intuitive, requiring further
explanation. Economic development and the rule of law are positively related; hence, the
impact of the former seems to dominate, driving cost of debt.
[Insert Figure 2]
[Insert Table 5]
Table 6 combines the direct and indirect effects of each variable on cost of debt. This
is shown for the overall cost of debt in column labeled ALL and the three components of
cost of debt. The combined effect of climate vulnerability on cost of debt and all of its
components is positive. After controlling for the interrelation between good governance,
economic development and climate vulnerability, it is evident that countries more exposed
to climate risk suffer an additional increase in cost of debt. The effect of GDP per capita is
negative based on all three components of cost of debt. Yet, the impact of the rule of law
is again more complicated. In line with Table 5, the overall impact of the rule of law on
cost of debt is positive with a small magnitude of impact. However, on the country level
and in the long run, improving the rule of law diminishes these components – but the firm-
level effects dominate. In summary, the results demonstrate that economic development
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as measured by the log GDP per capita is a reliable predictor of cost of debt. Climate risk
drives cost of capital through its impact on the log GDP per capita.
[Insert Table 6]
Our empirical results can provide an estimate of the average impact of climate vulner-
ability on cost of debt based on 63,102 of firms in 80 countries over the period 1993-2017.
Considering the partial impact reported in Table 6 based on the structural-equation model,
we estimate an effect of 0.061 on cost of debt due to a marginal increase in climate vulner-
ability. Taking the average values of climate vulnerability in low and high-risk countries
suggests that cost of debt is (0.478−0.342)×0.061 = 0.830% higher in high-risk countries
than in low-risk countries due to their climate vulnerability.
6.2. Cost of equity
Establishing the impact of climate vulnerability on cost of equity is more challenging
as firm level proxies of cost of equity are more difficult to obtain. There are two approaches
to estimating cost of equity. First, one could rely on a dividend growth model and use
dividends relative to the value of equity as a proxy. Our measure denoted COED refers to
this approach. However, many firms, mostly in the high technology sector, do not pay any
dividends, limiting the usefulness of this measure. Second, the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) suggests that cost of equity of a firm i can be estimated using a stochastic market
model as in (5), where rmt represents the market index and r f t is the risk-free rate.
rit = α + βi(rmt − r f t) + uit (5)
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Equation (5) is difficult to estimate in less developed markets as these economies tend
to be less integrated, resulting in lower betas. Moreover, betas tend to vary over time, and
the quality of data (e.g. lack of trading) is an issue. Hence, we estimate country-betas,
comparing the leading stock market index with the US market, i.e. we take the perspective
of an US investor. The difference between rmt, the market index, and r f t, the risk-free rate,
is the market risk premium (MRP). Using data based on Damodaran et al. (2013), we can
establish the following model parameters, where j is the index of countries in our sample.
r jt = α + β j(rmt − r f t) + ν jt (6)
Table 7 explores country-level measures such as the expected cost of equity (COE)
using country betas and countries’ market-risk premium in column [B1], country betas
[B2] and the market risk premium [B3]. As shown in specification [B1], overall climate
vulnerability increases cost of equity using country-level measures. Models [B2] and [B3]
show that climate vulnerability reduces a country’s beta, whereas it increases a country’s
market risk premium. Countries more exposed to climate risk tend to be less developed
and hence less integrated with developed markets such as the US, reducing the correlation
between markets, captured by the country beta. In contrast, the market risk premium is
higher due to higher default risk. Finally, model [B4] cannot establish any partial impact
on firm-level proxies using dividend payments. In summary, there is limited evidence that
climate vulnerability contributes to higher cost of equity.
[Insert Table 7]
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6.3. Financial exclusion
Any study on cost of capital needs to rely on reported items in firms’ income statements
and balance sheets. Firms that are financially excluded do not have access to finance and
might report low levels of debt or might appear debt-free. To capture lost growth opportu-
nities, we need to establish a profit or production function, linking firms’ financial outcome
pi (measured by earnings before interest and taxes, EBIT) to inputs such as financial assets
A and labor L, which is measured by the number of employees. Using a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function with total factor productivity T , we estimate the following
specification in logs:
piit = TAαLβ
ln piit = lnT + α ln A + β ln L + wit (7)
To permit a change in parameters for countries more exposed to climate risk, we in-
corporate the dummy MEDIUM and interaction terms as follows:
ln piit = lnT + α ln A + β ln L + wit (8)
Table 8 reports different specifications based on (7) in [P1], with year dummies [P2],
industry dummies [P3], and country dummies [P4]. Model [P5] estimates (8) and es-
tablishes significant effects of medium to high-risk countries on the profit function. All
specifications show that α + β < 1, i.e. overall firms have declining returns to scale.
[Insert Table 8]
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From (7) and (8), the marginal product of capital (MPC) can be calculated.
MPC =
∂T f (A, L)
∂A
= αTLβAα−1 (9)
Optimal investment in capital A∗ follows from setting (9) equal to cost of capital.
A∗ =
(
TαLβ
COC
) 1
1−α
(10)
Hence, comparing actual capital with optimal capital results in a measure of underin-
vestment, which we standardize so that the measure lies in the closed interval [0, 100]. On
average, low risk countries have lower marginal products of capital suggesting higher in-
vestment. They tend to invest close to optimal levels. In contrast, firms located in medium
and high-risk countries have higher marginal products of capital and show signs of under-
investment.
7. Conclusion
Our paper combines the effect of climate vulnerability on the cost of corporate debt as
well as financial exclusion of firms. Our analysis highlights a previously under-appreciated
cost of climate change for climate vulnerable developing economies. Our results suggest
clearly that companies in countries with more exposure to climate risk exhibit higher in-
debtedness and higher financing costs. In summary, our analysis of 63,102 firms in 80
countries over the period 1993-2017 shows that on average the cost of debt in high-risk
countries is 0.83 percentage points higher than in low-risk countries because of climate
vulnerability.
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This has significant implications for economic development: higher corporate financ-
ing cost and financial exclusion restrain economic growth and development, reduce tax
revenue, and limit the scope of governments to undertake investments in public infras-
tructure and climate adaptation. This, in turn, contributes to greater vulnerability, curbs
economies’ growth prospects and puts the corporate sector in climate vulnerable devel-
oping economies at a disadvantage when competing in both domestic and foreign mar-
kets. Thus, the climate vulnerability risk premium could cause a vicious circle, where
a higher cost of capital reduces both sovereign and private sector investment, suppresses
firm growth and tax revenue and limits the scope for public adaptation finance.
Given that climate risks are expected to increase in the future, climate vulnerability
is likely to increase without adaptation investments that can mitigate these risks, which
implies that the cost of capital for the public and private sector in climate vulnerable
economies are bound to increase unless this vicious circle can be reversed. For this to
happen, climate vulnerable developing economies which have not caused global warming
and are not able to address the root causes through national action will need international
support. International support through innovative risk transfer mechanisms would help
to reduce the cost of capital in climate vulnerable countries, enabling private and public
investments that will empower these countries to enter a virtuous circle where higher in-
vestments and growth allow for greater adaptation finance, greater resilience and lower
climate vulnerability, which will reduce the cost of capital, facilitate further investment,
and and improve firm competitiveness.
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Figure 1: Median cost of debt in low and high risk countries
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Figure 2: Simplified structure of the SEM
VUL GDP LAW CON
COD
1 2
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
Low-risk countries
COD 200,104 0.240 0.441 0.015 0.043 0.078 0.173 1.894
LEV 200,093 0.168 0.146 0.000 0.043 0.129 0.260 0.474
WC 194,463 0.136 0.227 -0.408 -0.003 0.123 0.277 0.701
COVER 131,186 38.129 100.447 0.442 2.468 7.211 22.812 612.850
High-risk countries
COD 42,484 0.355 0.527 0.015 0.070 0.132 0.322 1.894
LEV 42,482 0.185 0.158 0.000 0.043 0.143 0.308 0.474
WC 42,034 0.142 0.228 -0.408 0.003 0.130 0.288 0.701
COVER 26,910 33.615 100.897 0.442 1.465 4.437 14.865 612.850
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Table 2: Decomposed cost of debt
N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
Low-risk countries
FIRM COMP 200,070 1.477 1.441 0.163 0.560 1.006 1.764 6.050
COUNTRY COMP 200,070 1.043 0.259 0.577 0.892 1.012 1.151 1.729
LONGRUN COMP 200,104 0.147 0.155 0.026 0.048 0.087 0.183 0.724
High-risk countries
FIRM COMP 42,450 1.568 1.484 0.163 0.602 1.112 1.882 6.050
COUNTRY COMP 42,450 1.064 0.359 0.577 0.729 1.035 1.371 1.729
LONGRUN COMP 42,484 0.228 0.201 0.026 0.089 0.154 0.285 0.724
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
COD 264,315 0.258 0.458 0.015 0.045 0.084 0.194 1.894
FIRM COMP 243,399 0.005 0.906 -1.813 -0.568 0.025 0.579 1.800
COUNTRY COMP 369,456 0.010 0.274 -0.549 -0.136 0.014 0.164 0.548
LONGRUN COMP 406,143 -2.147 0.921 -3.639 -2.874 -2.204 -1.503 -0.323
COE 1,019,784 0.036 0.025 -0.003 0.019 0.034 0.048 0.097
BETA 1,462,377 0.464 0.359 -0.621 0.172 0.435 0.763 2.067
MRP 1,072,734 0.075 0.029 0.045 0.055 0.064 0.088 0.320
SPREAD 1,072,734 1.594 1.933 0.000 0.000 0.800 2.500 18.000
VUL 1,384,284 0.377 0.072 0.260 0.333 0.363 0.414 0.596
LEV 613,990 0.107 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.174 0.474
WC 562,962 0.173 0.275 -0.408 0.003 0.157 0.353 0.701
COVER 210,132 63.807 145.177 0.442 2.691 8.740 35.139 612.850
SIZE 614,651 18.531 2.421 13.732 16.934 18.579 20.204 22.930
CASH 225,857 0.089 0.138 0.000 0.005 0.030 0.101 0.526
DIV 502,228 0.010 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.059
R D 135,254 0.094 0.165 0.000 0.005 0.023 0.088 0.641
TANG 585,497 0.277 0.246 0.003 0.053 0.219 0.442 0.810
ROA 339,552 -0.032 0.220 -0.779 -0.037 0.024 0.076 0.198
GDP 1,515,343 9.501 1.513 6.055 8.166 10.494 10.724 11.626
GROWTH 1,514,535 2.987 4.204 -34.898 1.046 2.348 4.784 92.123
POP 1,501,613 236.395 719.322 1.457 32.879 125.523 263.908 7915.730
LAW 971,470 0.782 0.965 -1.852 -0.140 1.299 1.627 2.100
IND RISK 1,577,550 0.095 0.293 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
VOL 1,577,550 482.543 1140.026 0.307 1.954 13.541 167.650 4508.168
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Table 4: Determinants of cost of debt
[A1] [A2] [A3] [A4] [A5]
VUL 0.595∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ -1.367∗∗∗
MEDIUM 0.039∗∗∗
LEV -1.212∗∗∗ -1.213∗∗∗ -1.128∗∗∗ -1.125∗∗∗
WC -0.134∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
COVER -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
SIZE -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
DIV 1.151∗∗∗ 1.133∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗
TANG -0.130∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗
ROA 0.215∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
IND RISK 0.014∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
VOL 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗
GDP -0.116∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
GROWTH -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001
POP 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
LAW 0.009∗∗ -0.011∗∗
ll -1.55e+05 -5.93e+04 -5.92e+04 -4.14e+04 -4.19e+04
aic 3.09e+05 1.19e+05 1.19e+05 82779.843 83870.028
bic 3.09e+05 1.19e+05 1.19e+05 82923.217 84013.402
r2 a 0.007 0.184 0.184 0.200 0.191
N 242588 137248 137248 104635 104635
Note: All models refer to OLS regressions with year dummies and robust standard errors.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Structural equation models
[S1] [S2] [S3]
COD
GDP -0.113∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
LAW 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
VUL -1.340∗∗∗ -1.340∗∗∗ -1.340∗∗∗
LEV -1.126∗∗∗ -1.126∗∗∗ -1.126∗∗∗
WC -0.107∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗
COVER -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
SIZE -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
DIV 0.443∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
TANG -0.128∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗
ROA 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
IND RISK 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗
VOL 0.000 0.000 0.000
GROWTH -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
POP 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
GDP
VUL -17.730∗∗∗ -16.221∗∗∗ -16.236∗∗∗
COVER 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
DIV -6.002∗∗∗ -6.532∗∗∗
GROWTH -0.106∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗
POP 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
LAW
VUL -9.161∗∗∗ 2.893∗∗∗ 3.504∗∗∗
GDP 0.695∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗
LEV 0.575∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗
SIZE -0.029∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
DIV 2.976∗∗∗
N 104635 104635 104635
RMSEA 0.239 0.056 0.047
CFI 0.625 0.987 0.991
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6: Total effects based on SEM
ALL FIRM COUNTRY LONGRUN
GDP -0.335 -0.061 -0.340 -0.675
LAW 0.023 0.118 -0.039 -0.090
VUL 0.061 0.107 0.003 0.059
LEV -0.372 -0.345 -0.169 -0.274
WC -0.052 -0.098 -0.071 -0.003
COVER -0.108 -0.183 -0.087 0.062
SIZE -0.093 0.274 -0.011 -0.433
DIV 0.049 0.014 -0.006 0.079
TANG -0.070 -0.085 0.012 -0.036
ROA 0.018 -0.007 0.002 0.036
IND RISK 0.009 0.006 0.002 0.027
VOL 0.005 0.004 -0.027 0.008
GROWTH 0.066 0.035 -0.124 0.130
POP -0.004 0.007 -0.002 -0.010
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Table 7: Determinants of cost of equity
[B1] [B2] [B3] [B4]
VUL 0.022∗ -1.794∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.226
BETA 0.073∗∗∗
MRP 0.288∗∗∗
LEV 0.534
WC 0.066
COVER 0.000
SIZE 0.012
TANG 0.230
ROA 0.284
IND RISK 0.195
VOL -0.000
GDP 0.002∗∗ 0.035
GROWTH 0.000 -0.002
POP -0.000 -0.000
LAW -0.002∗∗∗ -0.044
ll 2792.901 -121.806 2587.238 -4.57e+05
aic -5569.803 247.611 -5170.477 9.14e+05
bic -5531.945 257.899 -5160.218 9.15e+05
r2 a 0.890 0.312 0.188 0.000
N 839 1266 1248 124669
Note: All models refer to OLS regressions with year dummies and robust
standard errors. Model [B1] explains country-level cost of equity,
whereas [B2] uses country betas as dependent variable.
Model [B3] has market risk premiums as dependent variable,
and [B4] explains firm level measures of cost of equity.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Estimating profit functions
[P1] [P2] [P3] [P4] [P5]
MEDIUM -1.082∗∗∗
ln TA 0.839∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗
MEDIUMxln TA 0.073∗∗∗
ln EMP 0.115∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
MEDIUMxln EMP -0.034∗∗∗
ll -2.49e+05 -2.49e+05 -2.45e+05 -2.47e+05 -2.34e+05
aic 4.99e+05 4.98e+05 4.89e+05 4.94e+05 4.68e+05
bic 4.99e+05 4.98e+05 4.89e+05 4.94e+05 4.68e+05
r2 a 0.752 0.753 0.755 0.760 0.752
N 162750 162750 160785 162750 152306
Note: All models refer to OLS regressions with year dummies and robust standard errors.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
35
